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THE IMPACT OF CHINESE BUSINESS ONMARKET
ENTRY IN GHANA AND SENEGAL
Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel
In tandem with the intensiﬁcation of China’s engagement in Africa over the
course of the past decade, academic (and media) attention has quickened (among
many others Brautigam 2003; Alden 2007; Broadman 2007; Taylor 2009; van
Dijk 2009; Cheru and Obi 2010). However, this highly diverse subject ﬁeld has
been scrutinized mainly in terms of partnerships in developmental aid projects,
cultural exchange (Taylor 2006; Tull 2006; Kitissou 2007; Davies 2008) and
macro-economic and geo-political issues related to large-scale Chinese projects in
the natural resource or infrastructure sectors. This ‘enter the giant’ perspective has
prevailed despite the fact that, as Mohan and Tan-Mullins (2009: 588) put it, ‘for
most Africans the Chinese presence is marked by traders in the markets’. Yet,
while a few scholars have studied the export on a temporary basis of Chinese
labour to Africa (Gong 2007; Lee 2009; Ma-Mung 2009), the activities of self-
organized migrant entrepreneurs from the People’s Republic who are not
associated with big Chinese players have received much less attention. This is
true despite their sheer numbers, cumulative investment volumes and their
potentially stronger impact on local societies – due to their proximity and daily
interaction with local counterparts, customers, employees and other social actors.
Among those authors who do deal with this subject, many emphasize their
competition with and domination over local businesses (Brautigam 2008; Dobler
2008; Kernen and Vulliet 2008). Only one study that we know of has noted the
positive impact of Chinese engagement on informal traders’ access to the market
(Lyons and Brown 2010). However, the analysis is made at the level of import
statistics and thus does not contribute to our further understanding of the societal
impact ﬂowing from direct interactions between Chinese migrant entrepreneurs
and local populations. To date, only Niikondo and Coetzee (2009) have
investigated these ‘on the ground’ interactions between Chinese traders and
their African employees. However, they reduce and restrict the conﬂictive
dynamics of the employment relationship to the employees’ perspectives and to
general stereotypes, and thus do not adequately recognize the complex
interactions between the two groups –which potentially might determine the
mutually beneﬁcial adaptation of socio-economic practices.
In contrast, our research has revealed that the interactions between individual
Chinese agents and their local counterparts in Ghana and Senegal affect in
fundamental ways the social fabric of urban economic life in both countries.
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During our two consecutive ﬁeld trips in Spring 2011 and Winter 2011/2012 (with
a third visit, in the case of Senegal, in Summer 2012) – based on qualitative
interviews with 98 Ghanaian, 85 Senegalese and 195 Chinese informants in both
countries and participant observation in local and Chinese businesses – our
multilingual, three-person research team1 found a clear dichotomy. While
established local merchants in Accra and Dakar express their discontent at
the growing Chinese presence, aspiring African traders applaud the newly
opened pathways to gainful economic activity. We hypothesize that these
predominantly small-scale vendors – creatively appropriating the new situation
for their own ends – have found in the Chinese presence a means by which
to bypass the restricted economic, social and religious networks that hitherto
have excluded them from access to selling space, start-up capital and affordable
goods. We further assume that the emerging dynamic of petty traders –who
are claiming increasingly large market shares due to the recent democratization
of access to cheap Chinese consumer goods – has triggered a gradual process
of normative change within the two countries’ local economic orders. In
this article, by analysing three distinct new pathways into the market, we
present arguments for our hypothesis that the mere presence of Chinese
entrepreneurs has sparked observable processes of dis- and re-ordering in the
social relationships and normative frames that structure market entry in Senegal
and Ghana.
We begin by introducing the central urban markets of Accra and Dakar, and
explain how their market orders normatively prescribe distinct forms of
succession and access to crucial capital on the basis of networks. We then
illustrate the restrictive nature of these orders, by portraying the experiences of
aspiring traders who have attempted to enter into market trade – despite their lack
of relevant network membership – but who have failed to receive full recognition
in their business activities from normatively established actors. Moving on, we
next analyse the observable changes triggered by the relatively recent inﬂux of
Chinese actors into the market. Building on this, we then demonstrate how the
growing Chinese presence might create new opportunities for groups and actors
who have previously been excluded from the market. Scrutinizing the impact of
these developments, we draw to a close by arguing that this reshufﬂing of actors,
institutions and practices has, on the one hand, given rise to perceptions of
disorder for some, but, on the other, also fostered the creative adaptation of
limiting norms for others.
1The division of labour in the project was organized along the lines of different groups of
informants. Alena Thiel conducted interviews among Ghanaian businessmen and women, as well
as with local employees of Chinese businesses in Accra. Interviews were conducted both in
English and Twi; the latter involved the help of interpreters. In Dakar, Laurence Marfaing
conducted interviews in French and –with the help of a translator – in Wolof. The interviews with
the Chinese businessmen and women included in our sample were conducted in Mandarin by
Karsten Giese. We undertook our ﬁeld visits simultaneously, and thus ensured that the ﬁndings
from the different groups of interviewees would be exchanged among us on a day-to-day basis in
order to constantly inform newly arising questions and hypotheses. The method of participant
observation was a particularly useful tool for scrutinizing informants’ contradictory statements,
especially when those contradictions arose between Chinese and local viewpoints.
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Our country case studies of Ghana and Senegal share few similarities with
regard to historical experiences,2 political trajectories, policy formulation,
composition of populations, dominant religions and foreign relations. However,
what both countries have in common is, on the one hand, economies that harbour
a high incidence of informality. Informal entrepreneurs dominate the markets in
Ghana and Senegal, especially in the realms of distribution. Formal trade
organizations currently claim no more than 10 per cent of the market share in
foodstuffs (Chamlee-Wright 1997) and manufactured goods similarly reach the
consumer through largely informal business channels. Yet, despite the high
incidence of so-called informal economic activities, market orders cannot be
described as being irregular or disorderly. Informal market networks actually
steer a wide range of social and economic transactions. These networks, especially
when it comes to market access, also integrate aspiring merchants through
complex webs of relations, following speciﬁc social codes and norms – even
though formal regulation may be largely absent. In addressing informality,
Meagher (2010: 16) argues that ‘the key issue is not the boundary between the
ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial spheres, but the distinctive organizational dynamics and
power relations that characterize non-formal forms of order’. Thus, despite their
differences in detail, market interactions in Ghana and Senegal follow very
similar economic logics and analogous social constellations – especially in terms
of the orders that regulate a newcomer’s access to such capital needs as selling
space, market information, networks of suppliers and customers and, not least,
ﬁnancial stock and assets.
On the other hand, Ghana and Senegal have also both recently experienced an
intensiﬁed inﬂux of Chinese entrepreneurs seeking – independently of the big,
state-ﬁnanced infrastructural projects – business opportunities in trade, among
other sectors. Our research has revealed that these independent Chinese migrants
have settled in Ghana and Senegal so as to invest in various different business
activities – among others, pharmaceutical and medical services, petty manufac-
turing, hotels and restaurants and, most prominently, in the trade in cheap
consumer goods. While the Chinese in Senegal are free and able to obtain licences
to trade, Chinese businesspeople in Ghana are bound by the country’s Investment
Act. This limits the undertaking of certain economic activities – such as the ‘sale
of anything whatsoever in a market, petty trading, hawking or selling from a
kiosk at any place’ (Government of Ghana 1994) – and thus they conﬁne
themselves to the wholesale trade in commodities. In Ghana, Chinese traders
from Zhejiang Province dominate the scene. They engage in wholesale activities
on various scales, and usually specialize in one product category – for which they
maintain close, kinship-based network connections with producers in their home
regions. In Senegal, traders from Henan Province who had not necessarily been
practising this profession before are the dominant group. Their kinship-based
enterprises, which are less closely tied to producers than those in Ghana, sell a
2Although the systems of colonial rule in Ghana and Senegal differed in many respects, and
thus obviously had different effects, the common experience of colonialism was an important
factor, and a socio-economic force, post-independence, that continues to inﬂuence and inform
local attitudes towards foreigners – including the Chinese – to this day.
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wider range of –mostly fashion-related – commodities, and also operate on a
much smaller scale than enterprises in Accra.3
The recent phenomenon of Chinese economic migration to Africa has had a
number of historical predecessors. Both the Arab conquest and European
colonialism represented a penetration and permeation of local economies by
foreigners, who thereby contested prevailing economic structures. Under colonial
rule, other non-African groups – such as the Lebanese – also came to dominate
speciﬁc economic niches in many major cities across the continent (Garlick 1960;
Looß 1999; Peleikis 2000; Thioub 2009). The presence of and economic activity
ﬁrst by Lebanese, then by Indians, and more recently by migrants from within the
region itself, has provoked strong reactions among local populations and
entrepreneurs. Beuving (2006) shows how, for the case of Lebanese migration
into Benin, foreign businesses interact with local counterparts to provide new
opportunities – but how the former also rather exclusively remain within their
own networks of procurement for credit, market information and economic
space. Although the behaviour of Chinese businesses in Ghana and Senegal is
characterized by very different economic and social practices, we were never-
theless able to observe very similar tendencies. We did not ﬁnd any empirical
evidence that individual Chinese economic sojourners –whose business models
tend to be highly speculative – engage in any form of meaningful economic and
social interaction with the local population beyond primarily functional and
opportunistic buyer–seller and/or employer–employee relationships. Yet we were
nonetheless able to establish that – despite this apparently shallow interaction
between the two groups, which is hindered mainly by linguistic and cultural
barriers and misunderstandings (Giese and Thiel 2012) – the mere presence of
Chinese actors has a decisive impact on local orders.
THE NORMS AND ORDERS OF MARKET ENTRY
The term ‘market’ is a fundamentally ambiguous one. In the words of Bestor
(2001), it signiﬁes, often simultaneously, the webs of relationships, institutions
and distinct geographical spaces that enable economic transactions. Market
entry, then, can be deﬁned only loosely as the establishment and mobilization of
particular relationships that – embedded in the socio-economic spaces and
networks of the market – grant newcomers access to the capital and resources
necessary for independent economic activity.
In many West African economies, business and trading networks based on
ethnic, religious and/or socio-professional identities have long been a common-
place phenomenon (Lovejoy 1980; Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Harneit-Sievers
2010). These networks do not merely serve rational business interests, but also
morally embed individual merchants. When network ties are mobilized in order
to acquire large amounts of capital for investment in proﬁt-bearing activities and,
ultimately, personal status, they are often classiﬁed as ‘bigman entrepreneurial
systems’ (Stewart 1990). Within this type of system, networks have to be carefully
3We want to thank our colleague Karsten Giese for providing the analysis of the Chinese parts
of our joint case study.
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nurtured in order to enable their mobilization for access to capital. This occurs on
the basis of serious commitments, in the form of adherence to codes of sociability
(ibid.: 149). Social control further ensures – through sanctions imposed within the
network – adherence to cultural norms (ibid.: 146). Hence, once resources have
been acquired through these networks, they cannot be deployed freely but have to
remain circulating within particular webs of social relationships. In other words,
although every entrepreneur relies on ‘weak ties’ for the exploration of new
proﬁtable terrains – in addition to ‘strong ties’ activated for mobilizing resources
(Granovetter 1983) – the movement of capital within networks is always
ultimately more or less exclusive.
The exclusiveness of these networks, then, is central to the reproduction of the
normative systems of the market, as it serves to uphold particular subject
positions in relation to other networked actors, institutions and practices.
Normatively, the status and social acceptance of established merchants is
critically dependent on their fulﬁlment of the intrinsic obligation to redistribute
wealth. Thus economic success obliges Senegalese merchants to return part of
their proﬁts to the Muslim brotherhoods for reinvestment in socially meaningful
projects. Similarly, in Ghana there is a social obligation to share with ‘those who
were less fortunate to escape poverty’ (Merchant No. 2, Ghana 2011 interview),
which means mainly with members of their extended family or co-villagers – but
also with needy elders in the marketplace. However, it is mainly close relatives
and acquaintances within what Meagher (2006) refers to as ‘networks of
accumulation’ who beneﬁt from this social norm of redistribution, as opposed
to those embedded in ‘networks of survival’. Networks of accumulation are
characterized by their closure to outsiders, maintained through group boundaries
resultant from participation in particular social or religious institutions. ‘Those
excluded from these networks of advantage [are] conﬁned to narrower, more
poorly resourced personal networks . . . made up largely of kinship, hometown,
friendship, and church ties with those equally disadvantaged’ (ibid.: 571). Amin
(1969: 180ff) established that Senegalese businesses cease to exist upon the
disappearance of their owner. However, a speciﬁc form of transmission of capital
persists both in Ghana and Senegal that is not geared vertically towards heirs, but
which diagonally favours subsequent generations in the established merchant’s
lifetime and which – rooted in the compensation of time and labour invested by a
young niece or nephew (kin or classiﬁcatory) of the businessmen and women
(Marfaing and Sow 1999: 201) – ensures reproduction. The lion’s share of
established entrepreneurs’ social obligations thus favours their own network of
accumulation.
Market orders in both Ghana and Senegal are rooted in a norm of ‘give and
take’ that, according to Guyer (2004), is particular to West African economic
value systems. Instead of a system of pure self-interested accumulation (‘piling up
the same upon the same’), West African economic actors instead follow a logic of
‘composition’ – characterized by ‘the capacity of merchants to combine different
value registers’ (Guyer 1993, 2004). One of these non-monetary registers, termed
by Guyer as ‘wealth in people’, illustrates how taking responsibility for
others – that is, training them in the trade profession and providing initial capital
and guidance, among other socially enforced obligations – is also a means of self-
realization as a respectable and recognized person within established market
networks. Networks of accumulation thus do not merely reproduce themselves
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and their underlying normative principles through internally enforced gate-
keeping mechanisms, but simultaneously produce status and recognition for
merchants within them.
In line with these theoretical perspectives, the introduction of a new merchant
into the urban markets of Ghana and Senegal follows speciﬁc rules – tacit
knowledge about which is generalized and widespread throughout both societies.
Up-and-coming merchants are integrated into the market through relations of
patronage, usually involving a close relative. In the rare case where the
apprenticeship-type relation is extended to a close acquaintance of the family,
they are usually addressed as classiﬁcatory mothers or fathers – thus underscoring
the elements of trust, respect and seniority in the relationship (Merchant No. 18,
Ghana 2011 interview). Within the apprenticeship, the transmission of
knowledge – as well as the conditions for obtaining independence upon its
completion – are subject to moral contracts4 between the parties involved, and
also to social control within the (kinship) network. As a general pattern, the
apprentices spend, at an early age, a lot of time in the market with their patron.
Youths thus get to know the environment and the basic principles of price
making, bargaining and marketing (Clark 1994), assimilate the marketing skills,
and internalize the normative principles and ethics that later set them apart from
untrained traders. With time, and often following a strict learning periodization,
the young aspirant is given ever-increasing responsibility and is eventually asked
to sell small amounts of wares in the market’s alleys and sidewalks. Youths
generally take the commodities given to them and, selling them at a higher price
than was agreed with the patron, create a ﬁrst surplus for themselves. This form of
commodity loan eventually becomes the ﬁnancial basis for the branching out
from the patron’s trade into an independent business endeavour. In Senegal,
where apprenticeship follows more predeﬁned stages than it does in Ghana, a
protégé commences with ambulant selling for about twelve months before he or
she then gets to be employed in the storage of goods for another year. Some are
subsequently sent abroad for an interim period of up to eighteen months in order
to ‘study life’ and so as ﬁnally to be ready to settle down with their own business,
ideally after buying their own boutique ( fond de commerce) (Trader No. 82,
Senegal 2011 interview). Either way, through spending enough time with a
patron, the apprentice accumulates both ﬁnancial and social capital that is
released upon the termination of the apprenticeship. This allows the protégé to
subsequently create an independent business after leaving the apprenticeship and
to obtain the blessing of the patron, in the case of Ghana, or of their religious
leader, the marabout, in the case of Senegal.
4We choose the term ‘moral contract’ as a demarcation from the ‘moral economy’ tradition
developed in the social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s by E. P. Thompson, J. Scott and
G. Hyden, among others. While the ‘moral economy’ debate may have a lot of commonalities
with the present argument, we intend to emphasize the ways in which order and disorder
structurally come into existence and are constantly subject to change, rather than to deﬁne ‘moral
economy’ and ‘economy of affection’ in their relation to given economic and political interests.
Most importantly, we do not see the economies in our country cases as ‘defensive’ about social
change (Hyden 2006), but want to emphasize instead the creativity and adaptation of local actors
vis-à-vis new stakeholders and new orders.
651CHINESE BUSINESS IN WEST AFRICA
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 May 2015 IP address: 213.39.242.4
Since the 1980s, the mode of knowledge transfer prevalent in Ghana and
Senegal has also taken more formal shapes – such as studying in European or
American business schools. In Senegal, the parents – often themselves illiterate –
of this new group of merchants initially regretted that their offspring had returned
with commercial skills and marketing knowledge that, in their view, were
incommensurable to Senegalese commercial culture and values (Marfaing and
Sow 1999: 170; Boesen and Marfaing 2007). From the 1990s onward, the visa
obligations introduced for Europe, together with the devaluation of the CFA
Franc in 1994, created a veritable enthusiasm among parents for the business
schools in Morocco –where education was not only less expensive than in Europe
but also recognized both the values of Islam and of a society similar to their own.
Now, the children of the big merchants go to school but the connection with the
region remains strong, their ways of living in the foreign countries stay
Senegalese. When the youth are in a foreign country, they come back during
holidays and work in the shop of their father, and the father makes use of all
possibilities to come and visit the sons abroad. Today, the inheritance from father
to son depends on his education (Merchant No. 21, Senegal 2011 interview).
Since the 1980s, too, the ﬁrst business schools have been established in Ghana
and Senegal. The major female merchants of Ghana, in particular, encouraged
their daughters to increase their economic independence through education
(Merchant No. 52, Ghana 2011 interview). In general, however, knowledge
transfer in both Ghana and Senegal continued as ‘learning by doing’, under the
close supervision of a more experienced relative. The current, educated generation
of merchants often started working at a very young age in one of their parents’
shops, so as to learn the real trade and in order to assimilate the business ethics
and strategies as a ‘way of life’ (Gueye 2008). During the school holidays, they
roam as ambulant vendors or as callers, the so-called Ranguman5 (N’Diaye 2007;
Dabo 2011), attracting customers to their relative’s shop; or, they integrate their
family’s business into their student life, selling goods to fellow students in order
to support themselves (Merchant No. 52, Ghana 2011 interview; Merchant
No. 47, Senegal 2011 interview). Despite the ascent of educational investments,
established norms and orders of market entry thus remain largely untouched.
In short, a general norm in Ghana and Senegal is that aspiring merchants
obtain by their own hand the ﬁnancial and social capital required for independent
economic activity, as mediated by their particular social, religious and economic
networks. Newcomers’ entitlement to capital needs – such as training, market
information and contacts, as well as commodities and loans – are the ﬂipside of
established merchants’ obligations toward the very same networks that supported
them in the initial stages of their own careers. Hence, by acting as gatekeepers to
the market system – that is, by limiting their assistance only to members of their
networks of accumulation – they guarantee the reproduction of the norms and
orders of the market on their own terms, and prevent the ‘transformation of the
country into a souk’ (Expert No. 70, Senegal 2011 interview). ‘Trade has a
history,’ one Senegalese informant pointed out (Merchant No. 83, Senegal 2012
interview). ‘A real merchant does not waste his capital like the youth of the
Centenaire’ (designed as a middle-class quartier, now famous for its street market
5Rangu derives from the Wolof expression for ‘to fetch’.
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and ‘Chinatown’ ﬂavour) (ibid.). Being a merchant, from this perspective, is about
the rigour of engagement and absolute dedication to the business. In other words,
a young merchant has learned the relevance of managing risks by separating
private and business capital. She or he has a clear vision and business objective,
and constantly seeks to secure the business by diversifying into new areas. The
substantial gain in status motivates about 100,000 merchants in Senegal each to
allow ﬁve to twenty apprentices to assimilate the relevant sociabilities of the
market order (Trader No. 82, Senegal 2011 interview). However, many merchants
point out that, ‘you cannot train everybody’ (Merchant No. 35, Senegal 2011
interview).
‘IRREGULAR’ MARKET ENTRY IN THE ABSENCE OF
NETWORK ACCESS
Merchants in Ghana and Senegal monopolize and reproduce the established
order on a day-to-day basis, by enforcing existing access restrictions and by
constructing particular subject positions. An important social differentiation is
thus upheld in market actors’ accounts between those merchants initiated to the
profession through their networks of accumulation and those who come to trade
in the absence of such support networks. In order to demarcate this emic
differentiation, we refer throughout this article to traders as those who belong to
the ‘networks of survival’ category – though their economic success based on
creativity and improvisation may prove this term to be misleading – and
merchants as those embedded in ‘networks of accumulation’, in which implicit
skills – such as diversiﬁcation and management of entrepreneurial risks – are
handed down from patron to apprentice in a normatively prescribed fashion. This
difference has already been observed in historical ethnographic accounts that
distinguish traders from merchants not on the basis of the commodities that they
sell, but on their institutional organization – associated with rank, descent,
ownership of property and/or their role in commercial and cultural relations
(Middleton 2003).
The differentiation between traders and merchants prevails despite the steady
increase in the number of market participants who have not undergone the
normatively prescribed sequence of training and assimilation of ethics and
business strategies. In particular, the national economic reforms that followed the
wave of structural adjustment programmes orchestrated by the World Bank in the
1980s have led to a large inﬂux of actors into the trade business, as cuts in formal
employment and agricultural subsidies have effectively curtailed alternative
income-generating opportunities (Overå 2007). Similar to learning the trade
profession, employment in most economic sectors of Ghana and Senegal is
accessed through the ability to utilize one’s membership of social networks –
rather than through formal education or training (Chant and Jones 2005).
A strong preference towards employing one’s kin persists throughout the entire
economy of both countries (Velenchik 1995; Collier and Garg 1999; for youth
employment in the form of apprenticeships, see Peil 1970; for the trade sector, see
Clark 1994). While the boundaries of these networks may be ﬂexibly extended, in
order, for example, to integrate the daughters of close friends and colleagues, their
exclusive nature remains remarkable and creates serious inequalities among
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youth, especially in urban contexts (GSS 2008; ANSD 2009). Ofﬁcial statistics
show that a large number of people depend on petty trading for their livelihood.
In Ghana, trade is the main economic activity after agricultural labour,
employing 15.2 per cent of the working population (GSS 2008). More females
(21.6 per cent) work in trade than males (8.4 per cent) (GSS 2008), though Overå
(2007) has noted the emergence of a reverse trend since the inception of the
structural adjustment programmes. As a survival strategy for people without
formal education and training, petty trade also sustains large numbers of both
internal and regional migrants. In Ghana, 19 per cent of migrants are internal,
with the majority falling in the age range of 19 to 25. These numbers are
comparable for Senegal, where about half of the population is under 20 years of
age. Unemployment for both men (15 per cent) and women (25 per cent) is
highest in this age group (ANSD 2009). The number of migrants in Dakar is
currently estimated at around 20 per cent and, as in Accra (19 per cent), they come
predominantly from other urban centres of the country (GSS 2008: 53; ANSD
2009: 382–92).
Although these traders sell in urban centres by the thousands, their presence is
still not perceived as normal by either established merchants –who complain
about customers conveniently buying off the street rather than entering their
boutiques – or by public authorities, who can no longer keep track of the steadily
growing trade activities – in terms of infrastructural and sanitary services, as well
as tax collection (Expert No. 55, Ghana 2012 interview). Newcomers thus not
only lack support from ofﬁcial bodies, but are also excluded from the socio-
economic networks that create social control and trust, and thus mediate access to
the institutions and relationships that grant more substantial market-based
assistance – such as commodity loans as start-up capital. Only in exceptional
circumstances do they receive assistance either from religious associations
(dahiras in Dakar) or other social institutions, such as women’s or prayer groups,
who help them with short-term accommodation and/or food items. Limited in
their activities to their networks of survival, traders consequently have fewer
opportunities to accumulate substantial business capital and only slowly acquire
the means to invest – achieved by saving in the so-called tontine (Senegal) or
adashie (Ghana) credit pools, or in the susu saving system (Ghana). While credit
associations are, above all, a means for women to pool resources so as to insure
against unforeseeable events and losses, susu saving is an informal banking system
that is open to any entrepreneur (Gabianu 1990). However, although these means
may in the long run allow one to accumulate a respectable sum, they do not
always effectively secure the capital against claims by one’s extended family and
the wider networks of survival. Lacking the training and supervision of an
experienced merchant, aspiring traders often do not differentiate between private
and business expenses,6 and thus face a higher risk of inadvertently losing their
capital stock.
Nonetheless, in some instances exceptionally successful traders manage to grow
their business to an impressive size and then settle down in a ﬁxed boutique. This,
however, does not alter their status as irregular actors in the market, who still are
seen to represent a deviation from the norm. While basic marketing skills are
6A medium-scale survey of 50 traders each in Dakar and Accra conﬁrmed this analysis.
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extremely prevalent in Ghana and Senegal (Clark 1994; ILO/DWCP, 2009
interview), a clear distinction is upheld between the mere act of selling and the
complex socialization into the carefully reproduced order of the market. A trader
will not be considered a ‘real’ merchant if the ‘codes of sociability’ (Elias 1991)
have not been respected. What distinguishes fully recognized merchants from
traders is thus not, ﬁrst and foremost, their amounts of stock, but rather their
integration in the market networks. This integration manifests itself in the
adherence to, and reproduction of, the norms of capital transfer – be it in the form
of skills, contacts or material values – and, eventually, the investment decisions
taken in light of these expectations. A ‘real merchant’ not only has the social
obligation to redistribute wealth among the up-and-coming generation in his or
her network, but has also internalized the ability to manage large amounts of
capital and to reduce the risk inherent in its repeated rotation – by diversifying
into new business prospects, such as machines, building and/or agricultural
investments (Merchant No. 2, Ghana 2011 interview; Trader No. 49, Senegal
2011 interview). In the absence of these business strategies and ethics, while
traders may refer to themselves as merchants – thereby emphasizing their personal
economic success – they will not be recognized as such by fully socialized
merchants in the relevant networks of accumulation.
NEW PATHWAYS TO MARKET ENTRY
Independent Chinese entrepreneurial migrants have started arriving in Senegal
and Ghana during a time of major societal changes triggered by the
aforementioned structural adjustment programmes, as well as by the world
ﬁnancial crisis and shifting regional migratory patterns. While these changes have
increased competition in the market without as yet decisively democratizing
resource access, the inﬂux of Chinese migrants seems to represent a more deﬁning
factor in market access. Our ﬁeldwork observations have revealed that – since the
arrival of these Chinese migrants – newcomers’ market access strategies have
changed in three distinct ways. First, the low prices of commodities increasingly
imported by the Chinese from their home country have allowed new actors to take
up trade with a decisively lower entry barrier, and thus to operate independently
from the external actors previously needed for start-up capital. Second, Chinese
businesses have facilitated broader market entry as a result of constructing
markets and selling spaces in entirely new areas for emerging social actors. Third,
Chinese businesses in Accra and Dakar are employers of local youth, thus
allowing the latter to acquire start-up capital and to access commodities for their
own independent business endeavours.
Cheap Chinese goods and reduced entry barriers
The presence of Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana and Senegal is often acknowl-
edged as allowing low-income households to purchase new consumer goods and
services. What is seldom stated, however, is the fact that this also lowers the entry
barrier to the market for aspiring entrepreneurs. Hence, the Chinese presence
allows previously excluded social groups – such as unemployed youth and others
who lack access to the relevant market networks – to purchase commodities from
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Chinese stores and to re-sell them in the streets, in other markets or in other parts
of the city. Anything from nail scissors to picture frames is sold, until the young
trader is able to buy more expensive commodities in larger quantities. These
traders are often unconditional supporters of the Chinese presence, and respond
to the anti-Chinese protests voiced by commercial unions and associations with
strong disapproval. ‘The Chinese are our friends. What they are saying at
UNACOIS7 is their own business! For me, I want the Chinese to stay here,
because it is in the Senegalese interest. The state does not give us work; the
Chinese give us work!’ (Trader No. 44, Senegal 2011 interview). Almost in unison
with their Senegalese counterparts, Ghanaian petty traders claim that ‘the
Chinese are helping us, they bring us things [to sell]’ (Trader No. 5, Ghana 2011
interview). Although there are often shortages in the Chinese stores, due to the
quick turnover of Chinese commodities and the inevitably short lifespan of
consumer trends, these traders turn to other local suppliers for stock only in the
absence of other options – as it is at street level that competition over prices is
most strongly felt. With hundreds of sellers competing loudly for customers’
attention, it is almost impossible to sell the same or a similar commodity at only a
slightly higher price than one’s competitors nearby (Trader No. 9, Ghana 2011
interview).
Aspiring traders take a risk when they diverge from typical petty income
activities – such as selling fruit juices or home-cooked meals – to begin dealing in
commodities instead. With Chinese-supplied commodities, however, the risk is
minimal, as these suppliers – even though their primary intention is to retail
wholesale –will sell even the smallest of quantities to whoever is capable of paying
the agreed price. While many local wholesalers reserve particularly attractive
stock for long-standing customers, Chinese importers are different in that they
provide even newcomers with stock that is ‘moving systematically’ (Trader No. 9,
Ghana 2011 interview) –which thus allows them to rotate their capital quickly,
with greater effects in terms of accumulation. In this situation, the gradually
increasing amounts of money saved in the tontine, susu and adashie systems allow
newcomers to buy commodities from the Chinese whenever the money is released,
thus facilitating either entry into the business or towards the next level of business
size. ‘A thousand CFA francs a day for a period of six weeks shared between
twenty-four to thirty persons who know each other in the market, give me ﬁfty
thousand CFA francs to invest,’ one jewellery seller revealed, describing the
beneﬁt of her tontine. Buying small pieces in the Chinese shops and re-selling
them on trays in front of the same stores, she hopes eventually to make enough
money to be able to go to The Gambia or to Mauritania – ‘to bring back scarves
and perfumes’ as her established merchant friends do (Trader No. 46, Senegal
2011 interview). In Ghana, women similarly operate credit pools in order to
beneﬁt from wholesale prices in the Chinese shops. Or, on a smaller scale, money
is pooled by two or three sisters or friends, who then engage in the simultaneous
7In 2007, the trade unions – among them the Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels
du Sénégal (UNACOIS) –wanted to close Senegal’s borders to Chinese importers, and pushed
the government to try and remove the Chinese from the Centenaire. This led the Senegalese
traders from Centenaire to protest (Trader No. 5, Senegal 2011 interview).
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sale of a particular Chinese commodity in different marketplaces (Trader No. 26,
Ghana 2011 interview).
The cheap commodities offered by the Chinese suggest a livelihood to
numerous new traders who initially had different plans and ambitions. With the
barrier for market entry being signiﬁcantly lowered by the Chinese presence,
Ghanaian and Senegalese petty manufacturers – like shoemakers, carpenters and
miners – are increasingly entering the retail business, as they see the opportunity
to make greater proﬁts in that sector than they would in their original professions.
Over a period of only three months, one informant had more than tripled his
initial investment (Trader No. 9, Ghana 2011 interview) – and when we revisited
him eleven months later, he had quadrupled his business size and was now
dreaming of opening his own regular shop at Makola in the near future. This
phenomenon has also been observed in Dakar, where an informant stated that he
had increased his capital ten-fold between 2009 and 2011 thanks to proﬁt margins
of over 10 per cent (Trader No. 44, Senegal 2011 interview). This turn towards
trade activity also has to be seen, however, in the light of the heavy competition
that cheap Chinese commodity imports are inﬂicting on local production (Lebale
2011). About a third of our respondents pointed out that they had an artisanal
profession besides trade, but could not generate sufﬁcient returns from
manufacturing activities alone.
Yet other vendors migrate from the interior of the country, and beneﬁt from the
easy access to Chinese commodities by undertaking the selling of them as a
complementary, seasonal activity. In Senegal, farmers come to Dakar during the
fallow season to earn supplementary income. The conditions in the Centenaire
allow them to improvise as traders and receive quick returns on their initial
investments. ‘I come from Saloum; here, many come from Saloum. Most of them
go back in June, the moment they can take up work in the ﬁelds. Here, we sell in
order to buy the seeds. We have two professions’ (Trader No. 44, Senegal 2011
interview). As in Senegal, the rural–urban divide in Ghana is very pronounced
and many Ghanaian small farmers follow similar strategies. Despite the fact that,
statistically, employment opportunities are rarer in the cities than they are in
agricultural work (GSS 2008), a continuous ﬂow of rural migrants come to Accra
in search of highly contested income opportunities. It is those newcomers who
survive in the city without the support of an established relative who especially
beneﬁt from the Chinese as the providers of cheap commodities for sale (Trader
No. 26, Ghana 2011 interview).
The appropriation of selling space
Since the early 2000s, substantial numbers of independent Chinese entrepreneurs
have settled mainly around the former Boulevard Charles de Gaulle in Dakar’s
Centenaire, a quartier constructed in the 1960s for the local urban middle class, as
well as around Zongo Lane in Accra. While these locations are not registered
markets, the presence of the 150 to 250 Chinese-owned shops in each city has
nonetheless facilitated the emergence of new trade centres. In addition to the
Chinese stores, local traders have settled on sidewalks and vacant spots in front of
these shops. In these locations, the wholesale customers of the Chinese businesses
sell their imported commodities on trays, on the ground and/or as ambulant
traders.
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In Dakar, the right to use a boutique is acquired for an indeﬁnite period from
the municipality as a fond de commerce. In Sandaga market, about
CFA50,000,000 (approximately E76,000) has to be paid for a boutique; in
HLM market, CFA25,000,000 (approximately E38,000) is required. An
unspoken rule decrees that the right of use must be passed on to one of the
business’s apprentices, rather than to a stranger, when the merchant decides to
relinquish ownership of the store (Merchant No. 47, Senegal 2012 interview).
In Ghana, on the other hand, shop space is rented out on a long-term basis,
usually for a ten-year period with payment required upfront. The necessary
capital for a boutique located in and around Accra’s main market area is
GHS50,000–80,000 (approximately E20,500–33,000). In addition to this down-
payment, a monthly rent of GHS100 (about E45) also has to be paid. In many
cases, third parties come into the tenancy agreement and can easily double the
price of a boutique (Daily Guide 2012). There is, as in Senegal, an unspoken
agreement between landlords and tenants to renew the contract and thus to allow
successors to take over the boutique. However, since the arrival of capital-strong
Chinese and other foreign businessmen and women, landlords now often choose
simply to rent out to the highest bidder (Landlord No. 33, Ghana 2011 interview).
This competition for affordable selling space continues in the smaller segments of
the market as well. While stores in and around the marketplace are unaffordable
to most newcomers, small sheds in the marketplace –made from either metal or
wood – are much cheaper alternatives, but still nevertheless represent a signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial obstacle if assistance from established merchants is absent. Senegalese
traders complain, for example, that the security deposit alone (CFA450,000 or
about E686) requested for a market stall exceeds the value of their commodities
(Diallo 2011). In Accra, market stalls are, in principle, allocated by the municipal
authorities, but the physical constructions are in reality privately owned and
passed on to relatives.
In contrast to these ﬁnancial barriers to market entry, ambulant traders in the
streets only pay a daily tax of CFA150 in Dakar or GHS0.20 in Accra to the toll
collectors from the municipalities. Over the course of a month, this adds up to
between no more than E2 and E5. However, ambulant trade is generally caught
between being legal and illegal – though traders may have a certain degree of
formalization through business registration, it remains illegal to squat on
sidewalks, in public places and in similar localities. Ambulant traders are thus
regularly subject to police harassment, and so risk losing large amounts of capital
in the form of ﬁnes or the conﬁscation of goods. This is in stark contrast to
aspiring merchants who, supported by their network of accumulation, often start
by selling on foot in the vicinity of a relative’s store, which offers them protection
from raids, ﬁnes and conﬁscations through the elder’s status and their social
obligation to steward and protect the newcomer (Trader No. 9, Ghana 2011
interview; Trader No. 21, Ghana 2011 interview; Diagne 2007; Diallo 2011).
Chinese businessmen, being unaware of or unconcerned by this practice as they
do not have relatives who could claim the spaces adjacent to their shops, often
tolerate traders who settle in their immediate vicinity. They thus facilitate access
to selling space for entirely new social actors, who previously lacked access to
kinship relations and other networks that potentially facilitate such arrangements.
In these alternative arrangements with Chinese shop owners, traders are protected
from the authorities. As one Senegalese informant put it, ‘I don’t have a
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registration. If there is a control, I just make friends with a Senegalese working for
the Chinese and they say that I work for them’ (Trader No. 45, Senegal 2011
interview). Others go as far as to appropriate space within the Chinese shop for
night storage, thus making it possible to invest in bigger stocks. Traders in front of
Chinese shops generally sell the same commodities as provided by the Chinese
traders on a wholesale basis. This allows them, not least, to reserve certain stocks
with the Chinese wholesaler, and circumvents the common problem of accessing
attractive commodities at affordable prices (Trader No. 35, Ghana 2011
interview).
In turn, Chinese shop owners sometimes see the beneﬁts of these arrangements
to themselves – in the form of protection from theft, as well as convenient
opportunities to monitor current retail trends. In both Ghana and Senegal,
traders who closely interact with Chinese wholesalers perceive themselves as
intermediaries. In practical terms, this translates into negotiations with tax
ofﬁcers on behalf of the Chinese shop owners (Employee No. 29, Ghana 2011
interview) – but most often takes the form of warnings about thieves, or ‘mystery
shoppers’ who have been sent by the authorities (Employee No. 16, Ghana 2011
interview). This makes them feel like ‘privileged interlocutors of the Chinese with
whom they negotiate directly’ (Trader No. 5, Senegal 2011 interview), and this in
turn has marked (positive) psychological effects within a market system that does
not fully recognize traders who have not undergone the normatively prescribed
sequences of market entry.
Employment as ﬁnancial and social capital
The third way in which Chinese entrepreneurial migrants provide new pathways
into urban markets in Ghana and Senegal is through their employment of young
people who would otherwise lack access to the relevant networks that facilitate
employment opportunities, apprenticeships and, eventually, income opportu-
nities. Like the enabled access to selling space, employment with Chinese
entrepreneurs thus allows new, previously excluded social actors to engage in
gainful economic activities. However, employment by the Chinese in Ghana is
seldom perceived as a permanent employment option. Those working for Chinese
businesses in Accra are usually very disillusioned, and – given their particularly
marginalized position in the Ghanaian labour market – often take a job with a
Chinese trader in the absence of alternative income opportunities. Since salaries
are pared close to the minimum wage, and Chinese employers often fail to fulﬁl
the local norm of supplementing low incomes with allowances and foodstuffs,
options to save capital for private business endeavours are limited – and
complaints about employment relations and the absence of future prospects are
frequent (Giese and Thiel 2012). While in Ghana the employment of ten
Ghanaians is legally binding for all foreign investments (though most businesses
under observation employed no more than two or three Ghanaians, with the rest
being ﬁctive staff), Chinese businesses in Senegal are free to choose whether or not
to employ local labour. In fact, many Chinese businesses in Dakar do not like to
employ the Senegalese because they ‘steal our money in our absence of a mere ﬁve
or ten minutes’ (Chinese Merchant No. 13, Senegal 2011 interview). Generally,
however, every Chinese shop employs one or two young Senegalese. Employees
of Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana and Senegal serve customers, hold discussions
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with the local authorities who come to the shop, and organize the storage and
processing of orders. In Senegal, these employees are day labourers, paid about
CFA1,500–2,000 a day even though they may work for the same shop for several
months. Only a few are paid monthly – at a rate of around CFA60,000 (Chinese
Merchant No. 9, Senegal 2011 interview). In Ghana, a monthly salary of about
GHS100–130 is the norm.
Employees of Chinese businesses in Dakar and Accra usually try to improve
these meagre incomes with parallel activities both within and outside the shop.
Hence, although the employment opportunities offered by the Chinese barely
allow employees to save money, they sometimes help to facilitate the step into self-
employment – as employees ﬁnd creative means to appropriate the employment
relationship for their own ends. While some Chinese employers actively
encourage their employees to sell stock from the shop on their own account,
and thus extend the reach of the business (Employee No. 25, Ghana 2011
interview), other cases are less licit. Many of the employees of Chinese businesses
in Ghana interviewed by us make use of the frequent absences of their superiors to
sell some of the stock entirely in their own interest – either stealing the
commodities themselves or with the silent toleration of the Chinese employees
of the shop. In yet other cases, escaping the attention of Chinese employers, their
employees may make use of the weekly rhythm of accounting to sell merchandise
outside of the Chinese shop – either through commodity loans to friends or
business partners, or entirely on their own initiative –while keeping the surpluses
they generate. One way or another, the local employees can actually supplement
their salaries to the point where saving for a private business start-up becomes a
feasible reality.
Another, more licit, form of harnessing the Chinese business is the guarantee-
ing of loans to customers acquainted with the Ghanaian employee –who agrees
with his Chinese employer to carry the risk of a commodity loan to the customer
in exchange for the interest payment (Employee No. 16, Ghana 2011 interview).
Similar ‘services’ also include the reservation of stock against payment, or the
notiﬁcation of selected customers upon the arrival of new containers (Employee
No. 28, Ghana 2011 interview). For example, two brothers –working with the
consent of their Chinese employer – take a percentage of the sales for all
customers that have been acquired through their contacts after every arrival of a
new container (Employee No. 53, Senegal 2011 interview). Yet others work as a
group: one member works for the Chinese store, while the others sell commodities
that are bought in the markets of Dakar out of the employee’s salary, thus
boosting earnings with simultaneous returns (Trader No. 5, Senegal 2011
interview). ‘We earn more by doing business than by working for the Chinese’
(Employee No. 56, Senegal 2011 interview).
CONCLUSION: FROM NEWACTORS TO NEW ORDERS
Traders in Ghanaian and Senegalese markets generally aspire to sharing the
status and beneﬁts enjoyed by established businessmen or women –who own big
boutiques, regularly travel to China or other foreign commodity hubs, and who,
most importantly, enhance their status by training youth in their professions.
Disadvantaged in terms of market access, these traders face high barriers to the
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accumulation of larger capital stock; however, they are frequently able
to overcome these barriers through creativity and effort. Nonetheless, traders
are unlikely to attain parity of recognition with established merchants, because
they have not undergone the normatively prescribed sequence of integration
into the market – and thus lack knowledge of its codes of sociability.
Recognized market entry in both Ghana and Senegal is regulated predominantly
through relationships of patronage, and thus is determined by relevant kinship
networks –which are backed and reinforced by religious (Muslim brotherhoods
and Christian prayer groups) and social (commodity, hometown and funeral)
associations. Market entry is thus restricted to members of these kinship
groups and to associations that facilitate access to the relevant networks. Social
networks thus continually reproduce established orders, manifest in the subject
positions of the market and the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion creating
them. On the normative level, this ﬁnds expression in the socially enforced
practices of mutual obligation and entitlement for assistance vis-à-vis particular
groups, as well as the moral values (respect, authority) that are derived from
adherence to them.
Since the substantial peak in Chinese entrepreneurial migration to Ghana and
Senegal in the early 2000s, new pathways to market entry have become apparent,
providing aspiring local traders with new entrepreneurial opportunities. The
Chinese lack of concern with established constellations and practices in the
market has facilitated the circumvention of accepted pathways to resource access.
In creatively harnessing the potential of these new circumstances, previously
excluded actors have pioneered new avenues for income generation. However,
because they are bypassing, among other things, the role of elders, these new
paths continue to meet with opposition from established merchants. This can be
attributed partly to the absence of ofﬁcial recognition of the Chinese market areas
in the ﬁrst place. What is most signiﬁcant, however, is the fact that newcomers are
said to lack the necessary training in business ethics and strategies, which the
alleged Chinese ‘patrons’ fail to provide. While those merchants who emerge
through established networks are the beneﬁciaries of extensive training,
experience and insight into the workings of the local market, newcomers who
enter the market with the help of the Chinese are not taught any skills by the
latter – but, in the best case scenario, learn only to imitate some of their
entrepreneurial strategies.
Traders cooperating with Chinese businesses also often have a bad reputation
within local commercial environments because they are not living up to the norm
of returning parts of their proﬁts to society.
These small Senegalese . . . it is they who register a business and then cooperate with the
Chinese. They do not pay taxes, no duties [and] they import for the Chinese . . . but they
do not have a ﬁxed address; they are not reachable or controllable! The state does not
keep up with them. As long as all these young people do this, they do not cause trouble. It
is the state’s valve for tranquillity. The needs of the population are satisﬁed thanks to the
Chinese and the small saisai8 are also satisﬁed. (Merchant No. 28, Senegal 2011
interview)
8Wolof for ‘scallywag’.
661CHINESE BUSINESS IN WEST AFRICA
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 May 2015 IP address: 213.39.242.4
Many established merchants fear a loss of control over the market order with
the rise of traders to respectable business sizes without their intervention and
support. This shift in inﬂuence has also reached into the private domain, where
emerging traders are suddenly now able to fulﬁl the role of provider – a position
that was previously limited to the head(s) of the family. What lies at the heart of
the merchants’ consternation is thus undoubtedly that these developments are
calling into question – and indeed undermining – the very foundations of the
existing social hierarchy. ‘The youth are destabilizing the system,’ say established
merchants. Or they lament that ‘the norms of the market are threatened by what
happens in the Centenaire; the network of merchants is organized through strong
solidarity among its members and also by social control. Questioning all of this
means you no longer accept the leadership of certain families of merchants’
(Merchant No. 21, Senegal 2011 interview). Ultimately, a perception of chaos and
disorder has arisen – in the sense that African entrepreneurs remain in a state of
confusion and uncertainty about these ongoing dynamics. While the new
constellations are not (yet) recognized as correct and contextually appropriate,
the effects of the process of change and reordering are nevertheless already clearly
discernible. The changing orders of market entry are laden with emotion, which
manifests in the tensions and conﬂicts prevalent among established merchants
and migrant entrepreneurs from China. African businesspeople ﬁnd themselves in
a situation where they believe their activities are being threatened by the Chinese,
as the perceived agents of disorder. Alongside trying to limit the activities of
Chinese nationals in their territory, they also denounce their presence as illegal
and declare their practices to be illicit competition. As we have argued elsewhere
(Marfaing and Thiel 2011), it is not the commonly alleged encroachment on
indigenous trade that upsets local merchants, but the realization that the Chinese
presence has the potential to undermine and perhaps destroy traditional modes of
interaction.
We interpret this development against the backdrop of a theoretical perspective
in which the market order is seen as the empirical expression of the normative
sense making that regulates interactions between economic actors, practices and
institutions. Norms possess regulatory potential because of their existence above
and beyond the individuals who obey them. In their collective recognition, social
norms as a rule reproduce and reinforce established orders – in that they convey
the moral justiﬁcation for their enactment. As such, social norms reproduce the
practices from which they are themselves derived, and vice versa. Norms of
interactions in the market do not, then, derive from judicial codes, but are the
result of lived habits and social practices (Foucault 1994) – and thus the
possibility for innovative forces to challenge and counteract them is ever present.
Norms are collective in nature and relatively persistent over time, yet they are
never completely ﬁxed. Since, according to Foucault, the norm is the result of
practice it is – per deﬁnition –malleable – and given that the norms underlying it
also are, market order is simultaneously consistent but permeable.
Entrepreneurs in particular constantly manipulate the normative patterns of
the social and cultural processes in which they are embedded in order to maximize
individual goals (Stewart 1990: 150). Change in the normative order underlying
entrepreneurial activity is thus often a result of the intrinsic tensions of the
networked market system (ibid.: 152), particularly when entrepreneurs face the
conﬂict of interest between personal accumulation and the social obligation to
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provide for the next generation of market entrants. Yet, as we have shown,
normative change can also originate from those outside of, or excluded from, the
market system. It has been shown in our case study that when new actors or
institutions – such as the increasing number of independent Chinese migrants and
their businesses in Ghana and Senegal – settle in the market, they facilitate
opportunities for the circumvention of established pathways to resource access,
and thus enable entirely new social actors to achieve market entry. In light of the
norm, these newcomers are expected to behave in a certain manner – and their
entrance into the market through an unheralded facilitator is thus considered
‘abnormal’ in relation to the established practices of market entrance, and is also
consequently perceived as being a source of disorder (Deleuze 2004). Innovative
participants thus constantly oscillate between norm and practice in order to
beneﬁt from the newly discovered networks and opportunities. Yet, while their
initial behaviour may be seen as dis-ordering, their creative appropriation of the
new situation may give way to re-ordering when their choices are eventually
integrated into the established and normatively accepted repertoire of practices.
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INTERVIEWS
GHANA
Employee No. 16 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 8 February, Accra (male, 26 years old,
employment with Chinese shoe wholesaler introduced through elder sister who
is a customer, employed since 2010).
Employee No. 25 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 17 February, Accra (male, about
30 years old, one of several employees in a Chinese shop dealing in construction
materials in the widest sense).
Employee No. 28 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 20 February, Accra (male, 26 years
old, employed in a Chinese shoe shop from 2008 to 2012).
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Employee No. 29 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 21 February, Accra (male, about
25 years old, tertiary training, employment with Chinese to support his
studies).
Expert No. 55 (Ghana) 2012 interview, 13 January, Accra (representative of
Town and Country Planning Department).
ILO/DWCP, 2009 interview, 27 August 2009: National Project Ofﬁcer, ILO
Decent Work Country Programme, Accra, Ghana.
Landlord No. 33 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 23 February, Accra (male, about
50 years old, landlord to both Chinese and Ghanaian shops).
Merchant No. 2 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 31 January, Accra (female, 38 years old,
merchant family, works in her own shoe business close to several female
relatives’ shops in Okaishie market, imports from different Asian countries and
USA).
Merchant No. 18 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 13 February, Accra (female, about
40 years old, stationary cloth retailer in Makola market for about 10 years,
trained by and inherited market stall from her mother).
Merchant No. 52 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 16 December, Accra (female, about
30 years, jewellery wholesaler at 31st Mall, university training in business
administration, took over the mother’s business in the absence of employment
options).
Trader No. 5 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 31 January, Accra (female, about 20 years
old, sells Chinese imported drapery, mobile street vendor in Okaishie market).
Trader No. 9 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 3 and 16 February, Accra (male, 36 years
old, trained as shoe maker, started selling high-quality shoe imports from
Ghanaian wholesalers but shifted to Chinese wholesalers and cheaper low-
quality models to increase turnover, semi-mobile street vendor in Okaishie
market since 2011).
Trader No. 21 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 15 February, Accra (female, about
45 years old, semi-mobile shoe retailer in Okaishie market on the sidewalk in
front of her grandmother’s shop).
Trader No. 26 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 18 February, Accra (female, 21 years old,
mobile street vendor, retail of Chinese sandals).
Trader No. 35 (Ghana) 2011 interview, 3March, Accra (female, together with her
sister she has sold Chinese shoes for almost 10 years now).
SENEGAL
Chinese Merchant No. 9 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 8 February, Dakar (from
Henan, 41 years old, since 2010 in the Centenaire with his brother, one
Senegalese employee, interviewed in Mandarin).
Chinese Merchant No. 13 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 9 February, Dakar (from
Shanghai, living in Senegal since 2010, 18 years old, his older sister has been in
Dakar since 2002, interviewed in Mandarin).
Employee No. 53, (Senegal) 2011, interview 24 October and 14 November, Dakar
(he has a high school diploma, is originally from rural Senegal, has worked
with his brother next to a Chinese shop since 2002, around 35 years old, good
income, interview in French).
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Employee No. 56, (Senegal) 2011 interview, 25 October, Dakar (23 years old,
secondary school, he has been a street vendor primarily, from rural Senegal,
since 2006 he has been working next to a Chinese shop, low income, interview
in French).
Expert No. 70 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 3 November, Dakar (representative of
Confédération Nationale des Employeurs du Sénégal, interview in French).
Merchant No. 21 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 15 February, Dakar (UNACOIS high
member, around 55 years old, interview in French).
Merchant No. 28 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 21 February, Dakar (he was working
in Sandaga Market; in 1987 he was a street vendor, then merchant in Europe,
USA and now since 2002 he has been in China; he is UNACOIS high member,
around 50 years old, and says that concurrence is hard, interview in Wolof and
French).
Merchant No. 35 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 20 October, Dakar (woman,
merchant family, since 1987 she was working in Europe then Asia –Korea,
Singapore, Hong Kong then since 1994 China – 58 years old, today petty
manufacturer [chaîne de montage], interview in French).
Merchant No. 47 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 11 March, Dakar (woman, merchant
family, she has been travelling to Morocco, Europe then 2000 Dubai and
China, she is sewing drapery, shop in HLM-Market, around 50 years old,
interview in French).
Merchant No. 83 (Senegal) 2012 interview, 10 July, Dakar (representative of
UNACOIS, interview in French).
Trader No. 5 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 7 February, Dakar (former street vendor,
working in the Centenaire since 2009; 27 years old, interviewed in French).
Trader No. 44 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 10March, Dakar (from Saloum, farming
family, ‘has 2 jobs’, he has been working in Centenaire since 2009, around
28 years old, interview in French).
Trader No. 45 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 10 March, Dakar (his brother has
had fashion shoes fabricated in China for sale in Centenaire, since 2007, around
25 years old, without sales licence, interview in Wolof).
Trader No. 46 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 10 March, Dakar (woman, sells
breakfast from her home, since 2010 in Centenaire, around 40 years old,
interview in French).
Trader No. 49 (Senegal) 2011 interview 25 November, Dakar (farmer and
transporter of agricultural products, he is working in Centenaire between
seasons since 2008, around 35 years old, interview in Wolof).
Trader No. 82 (Senegal) 2011 interview, 10 July, Dakar (SINACOIS member,
about 75 years old).
ABSTRACT
In this article we analyse the currently observable changes in the norms and orders
that regulate market entry in the Ghanaian and Senegalese trade sectors. We
portray the three distinct ways in which – facilitated by the presence of
independent Chinese migrants – previously excluded actors are now able to
enter the market, without needing to rely on the networks that typically mediate
access to start-up capital needs – such as selling space, marketing skills and, not
least, capital stock. Creatively appropriating the new situation, these previously
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excluded actors have thus found in the Chinese presence a means of bypassing
restrictive economic, social and religious networks. In-depth ethnographic
ﬁeldwork in 2011 and 2012 has revealed that while aspiring traders from Ghana
and Senegal applaud the newly opened pathways to gainful economic activity,
more established local merchants in the urban centres of both countries feel and
express, in contrast, a discontent with the growing Chinese presence – as they see
their role as gatekeepers of the market order being increasingly undermined.
RÉSUMÉ
Nous observons tant au Sénégal qu’au Ghana des changements dans les normes
d’accès au commerce ainsi que dans l’ordre établi qui régule le marché.
Effectivement, la présence des migrants chinois à Dakar et Accra permet à de
nouveaux acteurs – de facto exclus des réseaux religieux, sociaux et économiques
en place qui permettent formation, accès au marché et au capital et ﬁnalement au
commerce – de contourner les normes d’accès au commerce en tirant judicieuse-
ment tirer parti de la présence chinoise. Un travail de terrain effectué en 2011 et
2012 nous a permis de constater comment ces nouveaux « commerçants » ont le
don de tirer parti des activités commerciales chinoises et neutralisent par là le rôle
des opérateurs économiques établis et l’ordre d’accès au marché qu’ils se
transmettent. L’objectif de cet article est d’en présenter et d’en analyser les
comportements novateurs, les stratégies utilisées, nous en distinguons trois, et
d’en montrer les conséquences au niveau de l’ordre établi, tant commercial que
social.
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